PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

As MARKED BY DEcIsIONs SELECTED FROM THE ADATANCE
REPORTS.

AGENCY.

In Rickards v. Rickards, 56 At]. 397, the Court of Appeals

uf Maryland decides that a principal cannot repudiate,
Sunday
as beyond the agent's authority, a contract made
Contract
and completely executed by the agent on Sun-

day in violation of the Sunday laws, the contract itself being
within the agent's authority.

ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS.

With two judges dissenting, the Court of Appeals of
New York holds In re Garber, 68 N. E. 667, that where a
judgment creditor sues to set aside an assignAction to
ment for the benefit of creditors on the ground
Set Aside
of fraud, and is successful as to a portion of the
property transferred to the assignee but he obtains no benefit
from the judgment, it is not an election by him-to take in
hostility to the assignment, and he may take under it, and
his judgment constitutes no bar to such relief.
BANKRUPTCY.

A liquor license, though transferable only with the approval of the Court of Quarter Sessions which granted it,
and not subject to seizure on execution, is not
Assets:
Liquor
only part of the bankrupt's assets but may be
License
claimed by him as part of his exemption: In re
Olewine, 125 Fed. 84o. Compare this case with the principle laid down in Mueller's Estate, 19o Pa. 6oi, and see upon
the subject of franchises and licenses as assets in bankruptcy
the note to Fisherv. Cushman, 43 C. C. A. 389.
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Against the dissent of two judges, the Court of Appeals
bf New York holds in Benedict v. Deshel, 68 N. E. 999,
Preferential
that in- an action by a trustee in bankruptcy
Payment
under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Sec. 6o, to
recover moneys paid by an insolvent to a creditor in violation of the provisions relating to preferences, proof that an
insolvent made a payment, the effect of which was to give
one creditor a preference over others from the same class,
where there is evidence from which a jury might find that
such creditor had reasonable ground to believe it was intended
as a preference, the intent of the debtor in making the payment need not also be shown. See Piriev. Chicago Title &
Trust Co., 182 U. S. 438.

BANKS.

A depositor, desiring to withdraw his bank deposit and
commit it to a trust company, received from the bank cashier
Transmission a suggestion as to a particular trust company,
of Money
and, drawing a check, delivered it to the cashier,

with instructions to deposit the amount named with the
company suggested. Instead of doing so, the cashier substituted the depositor's money for paid checks of his own on
the bank, which he was carrying as cash. Under these facts
the Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 2, holds in
Goshorn v. People's Bank of Washington, 69 N. E. 185,
that, even on the theory that the cashier was the depositor's
agent for the transmission of the fund, the bank was liable
for its misappropriation, the transaction amounting to a payment of the depositor's check merely with the evidences of
the cashier's indebtedness, and the bank, moreover, being
cognizant of the fraud through its cashier. Compare Ziegler
v. Bank, 93 Pa. 393CARRIERS.

In Mann v. Pere Marquette R. Co., 97 N. W. 721, the
Supreme Court of Michigan decides that a contract between
Llabilityfor
Negligence

a railroad and a shipper by which the railroad
builds a side track for the shipper's convenience

and the shipper agrees to indemnify the railroad from all liability for loss by fire, though caused by the railroad's negli-
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gence, is not against public policy, as, in putting in such
tracks, the railroad is not acting as a common carrier. See
in connection with this case Coup v. W., St. L. & P. Ry.
Co., 56 Mich. i i i.
The Supreme Court of Michigan decides in Robinson v.
Chicago & A. R. Co., 97 N. W. 869, that a railroad company
Pullman

Cars: Joint
Liability

sued jointly with the Pullmn Car Company for

death of a passenger who was thrown through
an open vestibule door between Pullman cars

cannot complain of the directing of a verdict for the car company, it not being concerned with whether the car company
was also liable to plaintiff, and the verdict and judgment not
being conclusive as to the car company's liability to the railroad company under the contract between them for the furnishing of the cars. Compare Moreland v. Durocher, 129
Mich. 398.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

The Court of Appeals of New York, with one judge dissenting, holds in Woodruff v. Oswego Starch Factory, 68
N. E. 994, that a law of New York, providing
Double
Taxation
for the taxation of rents reserved in any lease
in fee to the person entitled to receive the same as personal
property, does not create double taxation, as they are severed
from the real estate and taxed at their capitalized value as a
new subject of taxation, while the real estate remains taxable to the lessee or tenant.
Against the dissent of two judges, the Court of Appeals of
New York holds In re Dellano's Estate, 68 N. E. 871, that
the fact that there was no statute imposing a
succession tax when a power of appointment was
created by will does not affect the liability of the estate to a
transfer tax on the exercise of the power of appointment
after the passage of an act imposing a charge or tax on the
exercise of such appointment.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Continued).

It is decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Atkin v. State of Kansas, 24 S. C. R. 124, that the freedom
to contract guaranteed by the Federal ConstituFreedom of
Contract
tion is not infringed by the provisions of the
Kansas statutes making it a criminal offence for a contractor
for a public work to permit or require an employee to perform labor upon that work in excess of eight hours each day.
It is likewise, it is said, not in conflict with the constitutional
provision guaranteeing the equal protection of the laws. The
Chief Justice and Justice Brewer and Justice Peckham dissent
In Atkinson v. Woodmansee, 74 Pac. 640, the Supreme
Court of Kansas decides that a provision of the mechanic's
lien law of that state providing as follows, " In
Equa
Protection of an action brought by an artisan or day laborer to
enforce any lien under this act, where judgment
the Laws
be rendered for plaintiff, the plaintiff shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorney's fee to be fixed by the court,
which shall be taxed as costs in the action," denies to persons within the -jurisdiction of the state the equal protection
of the laws, and is therefore unconstitutional and void.
There is no reasonable basis of classification, it is decided, in
such law.
CONTRACTS.

It is, of course, well established that a contract to assist
in bringing about a marriage is invalid. The Supreme Court
of Vermont extends this principle in Jangrawv.
Marriage
Brokerage

Perkins, 56 At. 532, by holding that a contract

to hasten an intended marriage is as*obnoxious to the objection that it is a marriage brokerage contract as a contract to
bring about a marriage between strangers. See Morrison v.
Rogers, IIS.Cal. 252.
COPYRIGHT.

An interesting case on the question of copyright arises in
Bloom & Hamlin v. Nixon, 125 Fed. 977, under the followProduction:

ing facts: The plaintiffs were the owners and

producers of a copyrighted song, which was rendered during the performance of an extravaganza by an actress who was required during the actioh to step to one of the
Imitation
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boxes, single out a particular person, and sing the song to him
alone, accompanied by certain gestures, postureg, and other
artistical effects, she being assisted in the farce by a number
of other actresses. The United States Circuit Court (E. D.
Pennsylvania) h6lds that an imitation of the actress while
singing such song by another actress in which she, in good
faith, attempted to mimic the postures and gestures of the
6riginal actress, etc., and used the chorus of the song only as
a vehicle for the imitation, was not prohibited by Rev. St.,
Sec. 4966, as amended in 1898 (Q U. S. Comp. St: 19o,
p. 3415), prohibiting any person from publicly performing
or representing any dramatic or musical composition for
which a copyright had been obtained without the consent
of the proprietor.
DEFENCES.

The Supreme Court of Montana holds in Ball v. Gussenhoven, 74 Pac. 871, that the defences of contributory negliinconsistency gence and assumption of risk are inconsistent
with each other, do not rest upon the same principles, and the existence of one necessarily excludes the existence of the other.
EVIDENCE.

In Trainor v. German-American, etc., Ass'n, 68 N. E.
65o, the Supreme Court of Illinois decides that the books of
a corporation are, as to matters pertaining to the
Books of
Corporation
dealings of a corporation with one of its members as an individual, not books of a public nature, and not
admissible in evidence in a suit by the corporation against a
member to enforce an indebtedness in favor of the corporation on that ground, but only when brought within the rule
authorizing the introduction of private books of account in
evidence. See Rudd v. Robinson, 126 N. Y. 113.
It will be remembered that in the recent case of Davis v.
State, 35 Southern, 76, the Supreme Court of Florida admitted testimony as to the action of dogs in following the trail of a supposed criminal from the
scene of a crime. It is now decided by the Supreme Court
of Nebraska in Brott v. State, 97 N. W. 593, that the con-
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duct and behavior of bloodhounds after being set upon the
trail of a fugitive criminal may not be given in evidence by
the state for the purpose of proving that the scent of the
accused and the scent of the person who perpetrated the crime
which is being investigated are identical.

FOREIGN JUDGMENT.

In Dunn v. Dilks, 68 N. E. 1035, the Appellate Court of
Indiana, Division No. 2, holds that a suit cannot be maintained in Indiana on the doctrine of comity on a
Comity
judgment recovered - in Pennsylvania without
personal service on or appearance by the defendant on returns of nihil to two successive writs of scire facias issued
to revive a previous judgment of the Pennsylvania courts,
where the defendant at the time of the issue of the writs was
a non-resident of the state of Pennsylvania and out of the
jurisdiction of the court rendering the judgment

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES.
In Walker v. Harold, 74 Pac. 705, the Supreme Court

of Oregon holds that where the evidence shows a dishonest
combination between the parties to a conveyEvidence
ance, the declarations and admissions of the
grantor made after the execution of the deed are admissible'
against the grantee to prove a fraudulent intent. See in
connection with this case Horton v. Smith, 42 Am. Dec. 628.

JURISDICTION.

The Supreme Court of the United States, confirming the
decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Hughes v.
Pennsylvania Railroad, 202 Pa. 522, holds in
Federal
Courtm

Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Hughes, 24

S. C. R. 132, that whether the highest state court should
apply the law of the place of contract to a controversy respecting the rights of a common carrier to limit its liability
for negligence to the agreed valuation is not a Federal ques-
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tion which will sustain the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
of the United States over a writ of error to the state court.
The Supreme Court of the United States holds in Cable
v. United States Life Insurance Co., 24 S. C. R. 74, that
Federal
lack of an adequate remedy at law in the same
jurisdiction cannot successfully be urged to susRemedy t
tain the equitable jurisdiction of a Federal court
Law
of a suit to cancel an insurance policy for fraud when the
insurance company, because of diversity of citizenship, might
have removed the action brought on such policy in a state
court to a Federal court, where the fraud could have been
set up as a defence, although by exercising this right of
removal the company might have subjected itself to a revocation of its license to do business in the state, or, at least, to
litigation to prevent the state authorities from revoking it.
Two judges dissent.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island holds in Whitehead

v. Comstock & Co., 56 Ati. 446, that though a landlord
agreed with the tenant to supply the dwelling
Duty to
Repair

with water, and the water was supplied in the

cellar, which was dark, and by reason of defects in the pipes
water escaped and formed ice from which an injury arose
to the tenant, the landlord is not liable, there being, in the
absence of any agreement and of any fraud and concealment,
no duty on his part to keep the pipes in suitable condition.
Compare Royce v. Guggenheimer, io6 Mass. 2o1.
In Butler v. Nezwhouse, 85 N. Y. Supp. 373, the New
York Supreme Court (Appellate Term) holds that in an
action for rent the defence of constructive evicEviction:
Question for tion, caused by the landlord's failure to supply
Jury
heat as agreed, supported by evidence that during October the apartment was insufficiently heated or not
heated at all, that defendant repeatedly complained of that
fact, but without effect, and that he was obliged to remove
therefrom on October 29, should have been submitted to the
jury. See O'Gorman v. Harby, 4 N. Y. Supp. 521.
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LIBEL

With one judge dissenting, the New York Supreme Court
(Appellate Division, First Department) holds in De Sando
P.blicatio.
v. New York Herald Co., 85 N. Y. Supp. i i i,
of Photograph

that one publishing a photograph in connection

with a libellous article referring specifically to it is responsible for the libel to him whose likeness is published, though
another's name be printed beneath it, and the article states
facts tending to show he is not the person referred to. Compare with this case Morrison v. Smith, 82 N. Y. Supp. I66.
LIMITATIONS.

The Supreme Court of Kansas in Willianms v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 74 Pac. 6oo, holds that a foreign corporaPoreign
tion is "out of the state" within the meaning
Corporations of the local statute of limitations, and for that
reason cannot avail itself of such statute. This decision is
reached notwithstanding the possibility of serving such corporation with process.
A railway company which held goods in its warehouse
for a consignee at the place of their destination was induced
Action for
by the wrongful act of the consignor to deliver
Tort
them to a person other than the owner. Under
these facts the'Supreme Court of Kansas decides in Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Dale & Nessly Milling Co., 74 Pac.
596, that the statute of limitations began to run on the cause
of action in favor of the railway company against the wrongdoer (the consignor) at the time his .tortious act was committed, and not at a later time, when the company was compelled to pay the owner and consignee the value of the goods.
Compare Morton v. City of Nevada, 41 Fed. 582.

MASTER AND SERVANT.
Where one is employed as a salesman for a year, his wages
to be paid by the month, and he is discharged after a month's
Discharge of wages are due, and he has performed several
Servant
days' work on the next month, be can recover
the month's wages, subject to any counter claim of the employer; but for the subsequent days he can recover only
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if his discharge was wrongful, and then only as damages.
New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division, First Department) in Walsh v. New York & Kentucky Co., 85 N. Y.
Supp. 83.
MORTGAGES.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania holds in Saint v.
Cornwall, 56 AtI. 44o, that where one of two joint mortSatisfaction: gagors of real estate pays off the mortgage and
Evidenc,
takes an assignment of it to himself, and conveys his interest, subject to the mortgage, it will be presumed
that the lien of the mortgage was not intended to be merged
with the fee. Evidence is admissible, it is decided, to show
that the satisfaction of a mortgage was made by mistake,
misrepresentation, or fraud, so as to relieve the mortgagee
from the effect of such satisfaction. See Moore v. Harrisburg Bank, 8 Watts, 138.
Defendant placed notes secured by mortgage in plaintiff's
hands to collect interest. Afterwards she borrowed money
Assignment of plaintiff and assigned the notes and mortal Collateral
gages to it as collateral. Subsequently she instructed it to foreclose, bid in the property for its value,
and take judgment against the makers of the notes for any
deficiency. It foreclosed, bidding in the property in its own
name for the full amount of the notes, interest, and costs,
which was more than its value. Under these facts the New
York Supreme Court (Appellate Division, Fourth Department) holds in Minneapolis Trust Co. v. Mather, 85 N. Y.
Supp. 5IO, that having bid more than authorized, the plaintiff became liable as a purchaser in its own interest and was
bound to account to the defendant to the extent of the purchase price. Two judges dissent. See the case of Laverty
v. Snethen, 68 N. Y. 522.
NATIONAL BANK.
A customer of a national bank, being largely indebted to
the bank, and being in failing circumstances, and being the
Powers

owner of nine shares in a partnership consisting

of forty shares, each evidenced by a certificate
transferable on the books of the partnership, transferred his
nine shares to the bank to secure payment of his indebted-
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ness, the bank becoming the owner of such shares. Under
these facts the Supreme Court of Ohio decides in Merchants'
Nat. Bank v. Wehrmann, 68 N. E. 1oo4, that such transfer
did not, in legal effect, make said bank a partner, but a part
owner in severalty of the property then owned by the partnership, and, as such, liable for nine-fortieth parts of the
debts and expenses incurred in purchasing, holding, handling, managing, improving, and disposing of said property.
A national bank, it is said, established under the act of Congress providing for such banks, cannot be a member of a
partnership and cannot become liable as a partner. See California Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U. S. 362.

NONSUIT.

Against the dissent of three judges, the Court of Appeals
of New York holds in Bopp v. New York Electric,etc., Co.,
69 N. E. 122, that where, on trial of an action
Refusal:
for negligence against two defendants, one of
Waiver of
Objectons

them moves for a nonsuit, and, on denial of the

motion, excepts thereto, but puts in its evidence, and again
makes the motion, and again excepts on its denial, and crossexamines the witnesses of its co-defendant to show that it
was free from all responsibility, the refusal to grant the nonsuit is waived if at the close of the whole case the evidence
presents a question for a jury. See McMartin v. Taylor,
2 Barb. 356.
PHYSICIANS.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota decides in Henslin v.
Wheaton, 97 N. W. 882, that in an action against a physiMlpracice: cian and surgeon for negligence and unskilfulEvidence
ness in applying to the plaintiff's body a device
known as "Roentgen's X-rays" for the purpose of locating
a foreign substance thought to be in his lungs, the rule of
liability is the same as thaf applied in other actions for malpractice, and is one of ordinary care and prudence. The
court holds that the use of the X-rays was not in this case
an act of the physician in his professional capacity, and that
therefore he was not entitled to have the question of his care
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and skill in applying them determined by the opinions of
physicians of his own school. It is on this ground that the
case of Martin v. Courtney, 77 N. W. 83, is distinguished.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

In Beugot v. T.remoulet, 335 Southern, 362, the Supreme
Court of Louisiana holds that a person intrusted by the
mother of a minor living with her mother in
Use of
Prinlpal's Germany, with the interests of the minor in LouiMoney
siana, who deposits confusedly with his own the
funds of the minor to his own account in the local banks,
checking against the same at will, obtained a basis for credit
therefrom, and is chargeable with interest thereon. Legally
considered, he uses the money for his own purposes, though
the amount checked out may have left on deposit an amount
sufficient to cover the funds belonging to the minor.
RES JUDICATA.
The Supreme Court of California in Curtin v. Salmon
River, etc., Co., 74 Pac. 85i, decides that a judgment denying foreclosure of a mortgage on the ground
Judgment
Foreclosure .f that the mortgage was invalid is no bar to a subMortgage
sequent action to recover on the note secured by
the mortgage. See Powell v. Patterson, ioo Cal. 236.
SALES.
It is decided by the Supreme Court of Arkansas in Whitmore v. State, 77 S. W. 598, that where one pretends to
Intoxicating purchase liquor for another, his guilt as to
Liquors • making a sale instead of a purchase depends on
his own good faith, and not that of the person ordering.
The fact that one who purchases whiskey for another pays
for it before he receives pay is decided not to render it a sale
in violation of the liquor law. The court further holds that
the fact that one solicits another to permit him to order
whiskey for him, though it is competent evidence of a sale,
does not constitute a sale, it being lawful for him to solicit
others to join with him in giving an order.
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SPECIFIC

PERFORMANCE.

In Hunter v. McDevitt. 97 N. NV. 869, the Supreme Court
of North Dakota holds that one who purchases real estate
Outstanding
Contract

with notice of an outstanding contract of sale
takes it subject to such contract, and may be

compelled, in an action of specific performance, to convey
the same upon the performance of the conditions of the contract. The decree in such a case should require the purchaser to pay to the vendee, from the unpaid purchase price,
a sufficient amount to reimburse the latter for payments made
to his vendor. See in connection with this case Veith v.

McMurtry (Neb.),

42

N. W. 6.

TRUSTS.

It is decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania In re
Lee's Estate, 56 Atl. 425, that where a testator left a certain
to termiTermination sum to his daughter in trust, the trust
nate on the death of the husband, and the evident
intent of the trust was to protect the property from her husband, a divorce obtained by the daughter ends the trust.
Compare Koenig's Appeal, 57 Pa. 352.

WATER AND WATERCOURSES.

In Lonsdale Co. v. City of Woonsocket, 56 Atl. 448, the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island decides that where, in a
suit against an upper riparian proprietor for an
Riparian
Proprietors
injunction against the diversion of water by the
defendant, it appeared that defendant had filled a reservoir
from the stream during months when the rainfall was excessive, and that it amounted to simply a retaining of excess
water, which would otherwise have gone to waste, defendant
was chargeable only in damages for the available amount
actually diverted. Compare with this case Tolle v. Correth,
31 Tex. 362.

